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Abstract This study constructs a potential risk index
(PRI) for the 65 U.S.-based commercial nuclear power
plant (NPP) sites in relation to their surrounding popula-
tions. Four risk levels are defined: low risk, moderate risk,
high risk, and very high risk. Discrepancies that exist in the
sociodemographic characteristics of the host communities’
populations are examined as sorted by risk-level category.
It is found that a greater percentage of minority groups are
exposed to the highest levels of risk. In addition, percent
‘‘Hispanic’’ and percent ‘‘Other,’’ a grouping that includes
multiracial, mixed, interracial, as well as Hispanic and
Latino groups (for example, Mexican, Puerto Rican,
Cuban, or Spanish) are categories that show the greatest
percent change in both the period 1990–2000 and
2000–2010.
Keywords Environmental justice  Nuclear power
induced disaster  Nuclear power plant  Potential risk
index
1 Introduction
The communities that host nuclear power plants (NPPs)
inescapably face the various kinds of risks associated with
them. In many instances, the NPP siting process was
completed before concern for environmental justice
became widespread, and the host communities did not have
an opportunity to participate in the environmental decision-
making process. Lack of opportunity to participate in
decision making resulted in the NPP being built in areas in
which the communities involuntarily shoulder the potential
risks of negative environmental impacts that could stem
from the plant at any time. As a result, communities are
saddled with a number of environmental justice issues
without having possible solutions.
This study provides answers to these research questions:
what are the levels of potential risk associated with NPPs
and what are the sociodemographic characteristics of
specific populations living within a 50-mile radius of a
NPP? Specifically, the authors investigate the levels of
potential risk associated with NPPs and the sociodemo-
graphic characteristics of specific populations. To answer
these questions, the authors first identify the potential
generic risks associated with individual NPPs. The authors
then present the sociodemographic characteristics of the
populations living in NPP host communities within a
50-mile radius of a NPP, sorted into four levels of potential
risk—low, moderate, high, and very high. After discussing
trends that are evident in the demographics of these pop-
ulations, the authors discuss the environmental justice
issues these populations face and summarize their findings.
2 Potential Risks
The emergence of commercial nuclear power can be traced
back to 8 December 1953, the day President Dwight
Eisenhower gave his ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ speech, in which
he highlighted his plan to transform nuclear fission mate-
rials—then, as now, the subject of much public fear—into a
resource with a peaceful end use (Eisenhower 1953). On 18
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December 1957, Shippingport Atomic Power Station—the
world’s first commercial nuclear power plant, built on the
Ohio River 25 miles northeast of Pittsburgh—began gen-
erating nuclear power (U.S. NRC 2011). As of 12 August
2012, there were 104 nuclear reactors located at 65 sites
scattered across 31 states (U.S. NRC 2012a). The study
included the 104 nuclear reactors in the data analysis. Four
of these nuclear power plants were permanently shut down
after 2012: they are Crystal River, Florida in February
2013; Kewaunee Carlton, Wisconsin in May 2013; San
Onofre, California in June 2013; and Vermont Yankee,
Vermont in December 2014 (U.S. NRC 2015).
In the 56 years since the reactors at Shippingport came
online, NPPs have on occasion demonstrated a destructive
potential that goes beyond what human capacity can
manage. The first publically acknowledged NPP-related
accident took place at Three Mile Island (TMI), 26 years
after the Shippingport NPP came on line, when the plant
encountered a major core-damage accident. Fortunately,
the event came to an end on 28 March 1979 without
requiring an evacuation. Residents living within a 5-mile
radius of the plant, including preschool-aged children and
pregnant women, were evacuated but only after 2 days had
passed since the accident occurred (Three Mile Island Alert
2013).
The second demonstration of NPPs’ powerful destruc-
tive potential occurred at Chernobyl NPP in Ukraine, seven
years after the event at TMI. The Chernobyl plant experi-
enced an accident that breached its reactor containment
vessel and released radioactive effluents into the environ-
ment on 26 April 1986 (U.S. NRC 2013a). Areas within an
18-mile radius of the plant were abandoned and approxi-
mately 115,000 people were evacuated; an additional
220,000 people were evacuated in subsequent years. It was
noted that the impacts were far felt beyond the 18-mile
radius, reaching out to many areas of central and northern
Europe (UNSCEAR 2012).
Twenty-five years after the Chernobyl accident, the third
and most recent NPP-related accident occurred when an
underwater earthquake triggered a tsunami that hit the
Japanese coastline, causing massive damage at the
Fukushima Daiichi NPP (U.S. NRC 2013d). The Japanese
government in its initial response evacuated approximately
160,000 people living within a 12- to 19-mile radius of the
Fukushima plant (Morris-Suzuki et al. 2012), but the
impacted areas have proven to be much wider than the
evacuated areas.
These accidents at NPPs are normally preceded by an
event or a series of events that trigger or contribute to the
damage done to the reactor core. When brought under
control, events with the potential to have escalated into
major accidents—that is, those of the type capable of
causing reactor-core damage—are described as near-miss
events. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
issues an annual report detailing all near-miss events and
classifies them according to three categories defined by the
type of team sent out to inspect the event, which is in turn
determined by the level or degree of severity of the event.
There are three such teams—namely, the augmented
inspection team (AIT), the incident inspection team (IIT)
and the special inspection team (SIT). The AIT evaluates
events that pose a 10-fold increase in risk, whereas the SIT
investigates events that pose a 1000-fold increase in risk
level (Lochbaum 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). In 2010,
there were a total of 14 near-miss events (13 SIT and 1
AIT); in 2011, 15 (14 SIT and 1 AIT); in 2012, 14 (11 SIT
and 3 AIT); in 2013, 10 (9 SIT and 1 AIT); and in 2014, 9
(9 SIT and 0 AIT). These figures hint at the regularity with
which such plants pose a risk to their surrounding areas
(Fig. 1). The total number of near-miss events coupled
with a decline in total number of reactors showed a decline
trend in the past two years.
Another risk associated with NPPs is that of contami-
nation of the sort caused by the unmonitored and unplan-
ned release of liquids. Commercial NPPs release
radioactive materials into the environment, in either or both
liquid or gaseous form, on a routine basis. There have been
incidents of unplanned and unmonitored leaks of liquids
that occurred at the Braidwood, Indian Point, Byron, and
Dresden NPPs. The Liquid Radioactive Release Lessons
Learned Task Force (LLTF) has been tasked with identi-
fying the causes of such leaks (Richards et al. 2011). Their
findings included the following: (1) the construction of
plant components did not meet existing safety standards;
(2) the components that caused or contributed to said leaks
were not required to be monitored, nor were they subject to
routine maintenance activities according to NRC regula-
tions; (3) some components associated with subterranean
leaks or with spent-fuel pools were not readily accessible
Fig. 1 Near-miss events taking place at U.S. commercial nuclear
power reactors. Source Lochbaum (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)
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or physically visible; (4) liquid leaks can enter undetected
into groundwater; (5) the contamination of groundwater
may go undetected because it is not required to be moni-
tored according to existing NRC regulations; and (6) the
contaminated groundwater could flow offsite undetected.
The communities that host NPPs therefore, are at perpetual
risk due to the presence of their local NPP.
A different potential risk associated with NPPs is their
spent fuel—the highly radioactive used fuel rods that are
removed from a nuclear reactor. Nuclear fuel rods are
made of fissionable materials and retain their inherent
destructive potential long after their initial use. Approxi-
mately 74 % of all spent fuel is stored at the reactor site,
most often in spent-fuel pools, while the rest are stored in
dry-storage casks distributed across 33 states (U.S. GAO
2012). The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
projects an annual 2000-metric-ton increase in the amount
of spent fuel stored on site, with the current 70,000-metric-
ton spent-fuel stockpile growing to 140,000 metric tons
within a decade. New storage facilities are expected to be
ready to begin accepting spent fuel in 15–40 years. The
potential risks associated with such facilities include: (1)
the release of radiation, which could have severe negative
impacts on human health; and (2) a self-sustaining fire if
and when the water is drained and the fuel rods are exposed
to the air. Above all, the threats that are inherent to the
70,000-metric-ton spent-fuel stockpile cannot and must not
be underestimated.
This spent fuel is also always vulnerable to terrorist
attack (Holt and Andrews 2007). The terrorist attack on the
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon
building in Washington, DC on 11 September 2011—the
so-called 9/11 attack—serves as reminder of the dire con-
sequences and very real threat of a potential attack on a
NPP. Afterwards, evidence came to light that revealed Al
Qaeda had considered targeting a NPP in their initial plan
of attack (Holt and Andrews 2007).
According to the National Academy of Sciences (U.S.
NAS 2006), a successful attack on a spent-fuel storage
facility would be difficult but is possible. In the event of
such an attack, the spent fuel can become the source of a
self-sustaining zirconium cladding fire, and will in such an
event release a massive amount of radioactive materials.
Communities that host NPPs therefore live with the
unpredictable risk of exposure to a massive release of
radiation.
The intent is that these materials will not permanently
reside in the spent-fuel pools or stay safely in the dry-
storage casks housed at the reactor sites. When they are
transported, they pose risk not only to the host communities
but also to the communities at large along the transit route.
The purpose of transporting spent fuels is to relocate them
to storage space shared by multiple reactor sites operated
by the same owner (U.S. NRC 2013b). According to
Garrick (2003), between 1964 and 1997, a total of 3025
shipments moved 829 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM)
by road and an additional 1445 MTHM by rail. The
transportation of such materials is closely supervised by the
NRC and the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S.
NRC 2013b). Although regulated and supervised, the
transportation—whether by road or by rail—has not been
accident free. Between 1971 and 1995, there were four
accidents on the highways and four on the rail lines; one
highway accident resulted in the death of a driver and
detectable emissions of radiation (Garrick 2003; U.S. NRC
2013e). All of the approximately 70,000 metric tons of
spent fuel stored at reactor sites are waiting for shipment to
high-level repositories, when such facilities are open and
available to accept nuclear waste materials (U.S. NRC
2013b). With the Obama administration’s 2009 decision to
withdraw funding for the Yucca Mountain High-Level
Nuclear Waste project, there is at present no permanent
storage facility under development (Wald 2009).
Another risk that NPPs pose is inherent to their design
and serves to highlight why it is critical that the design of a
reactor that contains fissionable fuel rods during its normal
operation be centered on safety. The Mark 1 containment
vessel, first produced by GE in the 1960s and still in use at
Fukushima NPP at the time of the accident there, con-
tributed to the catastrophic events of 2011 (Zeller 2011).
As early as 1975, it was known that there had not been
sufficient testing of the containment design and that any
flaws that might persist could compromise the safety of the
plant and its surroundings. But the warning did not lead to
a halt in the operating of the design because it had by that
time been widely accepted throughout the nuclear power
industry. Harold Denton, a retired NRC official, pointed
out that the probability of a Mark 1-type reactor bursting if
the fuel rods were to enter into meltdown was approxi-
mately 90 % (Denton 1987). In the United States, there
remain 23 Mark 1 reactors that are exactly the same reactor
design as those four reactors damaged at the Fukushima
NPP site still in operation, located at 16 NPPs, including:
Oyster Creek, New Jersey; Dresden, Illinois; and Monti-
cello, Minnesota. The host communities of NPPs that still
operate Mark 1 reactors are at greater risk of exposure to a
Fukushima-like disaster than sites with safer reactor
designs. Nuclear power plants are also vulnerable to seis-
mic events of the type that played a role in triggering the
catastrophe at Fukushima. The NPPs sited along the U.S.
eastern seaboard in particular do not include in their
designs any kind of measures meant to shield against the
aftereffects of a strong earthquake (Koch 2011).
At the core of many of these concerns regarding NPPs is
the fact that radiation poses a risk to public health. Radi-
ation is a public health concern for two main reasons. First,
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humans’ ability to structure their environment, as individ-
uals, is rapidly decreasing because of population implo-
sion. This results in the inability to completely avoid
exposure from human-made sources of radiation. Second,
radiation health effects are not unique and are detected
only statistically. Standards and regulations for protection
must be developed using the information provided by the
scientific and medical communities with input from the
public and government. Additionally, there are two other
aspects of radiation exposure that need to be understood to
properly evaluate the risk to public health. First, not all
people exposed to radiation are affected equally. For
example, children are much more vulnerable than adults to
the effects of radiation. Second, radiation from internal
emitters is in a sense different from external beam radia-
tion. Irradiation by external beam radiation exists only as
long as the source is present. Irradiation stops if the source
is removed from the vicinity of the individual or the indi-
vidual is removed from the vicinity of the source. How-
ever, radioactive materials taken into the body (that is via
inhalation or ingestion) will continue to irradiate the indi-
vidual for as long as it is in the body and the material
remains radioactive.
Both the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP 2007) and the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences (U.S. NAS/NRC 2006) concluded that any
exposure, including exposure to naturally occurring back-
ground radiation, creates an increased risk of cancer. This
conclusion follows the linear non-threshold (LNT) model.
Specifically, the LNT model assumes that, in the low dose
range, radiation doses greater than zero will increase the
risk of excess cancer and/or heritable disease in a simple
proportionate manner. While further research is needed to
undoubtedly prove this is true, current findings support this
model and it has been adopted in standards and regulations
worldwide. Regardless of whether or not the source of
radiation is human-made, as in the case of NPPs, or natural,
as exposure increases so does risk.
The communities that host such facilities shoulder the
potential risks associated with nuclear power from the time
the plant begins operation until the time it is decommis-
sioned—for a typical reactor design, the use life is between
40 and 60 years (U.S. NRC 2014). After a plant is shut-
down, it takes under normal conditions 50 years for the
reactor to cool; this is followed by a period of decom-
missioning that normally takes another 60 years. For
example, Crystal River Unit 3 was permanently shut down
on 2 February 2013 and NRC scheduled to complete
decommission in 2073 (U.S. NRC 2014). The NRC has
advanced three strategies for dealing with end of use at a
NPP: (1) DECON, or decommissioning strategies; (2)
SAFSTOR, or deferred dismantling; and (3) ENTOMB, or
the permanent encasing on site of radioactive contaminants
(U.S. NRC 2013c). For example, Hallam Nuclear Power
Plant, Nebraska, a NPP with a short use life, was decom-
missioned in 1971. All potential containments were at that
time buried underground. Since then, the Department of
Energy, working in conjunction with the Nebraska
Department of Health, has monitored the entombment site
for possible groundwater contamination and radiation, and
will continue to do so for a period of 119 years, until 2090
(Nebraska Energy Quarterly 1997). Figure 2 shows the
location of the permanently decommissioned U.S.-based
commercial nuclear power reactors as of August 2012.
Above all, the potential risks associated with NPPs can
be explained by Perrow’s normal accidents theory. As
noted previously, NPPs are complex and tightly coupled
systems and complexity produces unknown risks.
According to Perrow’s theory:
Nothing is perfect, neither designs, equipment, pro-
cedures, operators, supplies, or the environment.
Because we know this, we load our complex systems
with safety devices in the form of buffers, redun-
dancies, circuit breakers, alarms, bells, and whistles.
Small failures go on continuously in the system since
nothing is perfect, but the safety devices and the
cunning of designers, and the wit and experience of
the operating personnel, cope with them. Occasion-
ally, however, two or more failures, none of them
devastating in themselves in isolation, come together
in unexpected ways and defeat the safety devices—
the definition of a ‘‘normal accident’’ or system
accident. If the system is also tightly coupled, these
failures can cascade faster than any safety device or
operator can cope with them… if the accident brings
down a significant part of the system, and the system
has catastrophic potential, we will have a catastrophe.
(Perrow 1999, pp. 356–357)
According to Perrow’s analysis, the risks associated with
NPPs therefore should be seen as intrinsic to the system,
normal, and as something that cannot be avoided.
3 Method
This section discusses the study area, variables, data,
method, and construction of the NPP PRI index.
3.1 Study Area
This study focuses on two distance areas surrounding the
65 NPPs. The two distance areas are similar to those
identified in the recent study of Kyne (2015). One is those
areas within a 50-mile radius of any one of the 65 U.S.-
based NPPs; the other is those areas outside of a 50-mile
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radius and yet that are located in the state(s) that fall within
said 50-mile radius. There are 20 permanently deactivated
reactors located at NPPs that otherwise remain active.
Kyne (2015) provided a notion that these 20 reactors do not
pose the same level of risk as do reactors currently in
operation, which pose increased risks as a result of their
day-to-day operation, the possibility of core meltdown-type
accident, and from their release of gaseous and liquid
radioactive effluents. However, they could be regarded as a
potential source of radiation risk from any spent fuel stored
on site. The reason for exclusion was to ensure apples to
apples comparison.
Index Plant Name, Reactor 
D1 Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power Plant, Humboldt Bay 3
D2 Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Rancho Seco
D3 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 *
D4 Fort Saint Vrain Generating Station, Fort St. Vrain
D5 Connecticut Yankee, Haddam Neck *
D6 Millstone Power Station, Unit 1 *
D7 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1
D8 Zion Nuclear Power Station, Zion 1 & 2 #
D9 Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, Maine Yankee
D10 Yankee-Rowe Nuclear Power Station, Yankee-Rowe
D11 Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant (Monticello)
D12 Fermi, Unit 1
D13 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 *
D14 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Shoreham *
D15 Trojan Nuclear Power Plant, Trojan
D16 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 1
D17 Saxton *
D18 Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2
D19 Pathfinder Atomic Plant, Pathfinder *
D20 La Crosse Nuclear Generating Station, La Crosse
Fig. 2 Permanently decommissioned U.S.-based commercial nuclear power reactors as of August 2012. Data source U.S. NRC (2012b). Note
*Located in currently operating nuclear power plant site. #Entire plant site with the two reactors was permanently shut down
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3.2 Study Variables
The study includes variables that are similar to those used
in the study of Kyne (2015). The racial/ethnic variables
included the categories (1) White—Percent White as per-
cent of all non-Hispanic Whites; (2) Black—Percent Black
as percent of non-Hispanic Blacks or African Americans;
(3) Asian—Percent Asian as percent of Asian, and Native
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; (4) Hispanic—Percent
Hispanic as percent of people who are Hispanic origin; (5)
Native American—Percent Native American as percent of
American Indian or Alaska Native; (6) Other—Percent
Other as percent of Some Other Race who are not included
in the White, Black, or African American, American Indian
or Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander race categories, or whose identify them-
selves as multiracial, mixed, interracial, or a Hispanic or
Latino group (for example, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban,
or Spanish); and (7) Color—Percent Color as percent of all
other races except non-Hispanic Whites. Similarly, the
study included the socioeconomic variables that were also
used in the study of Kyne (2015), which are renter-occu-
pied housing, unemployment rate, percent living in pov-
erty, mean household income, and percent composition at
the census-tract level.
Another study variable was distance, which was mea-
sured as Euclidean distance in miles from the census-tract
center point to the NPP using the ENVI’s ArcMap program
(Kyne 2015). The distance was used to investigate whether
and how disparities in certain demographic characteristics
were associated with the distance from a NPP.
Other study variables relate to radioactive materials and
radiation dosage levels. These include: radioactive efflu-
ents released from a reactor at a given NPP; the radiation
dose able to be delivered by those effluents; and the amount
of radiation absorbed by the human body upon exposure.
3.3 Study Data
This study included multiple datasets. To investigate
demography-based disparities in the study areas, this study
required three discrete datasets:
(1) First, for demographic characteristics, data were
obtained from the United States Census Bureau and
GeoLytics (GeoLytics 2012a, 2012b, 2012c), which
were also used in the previous study (Kyne 2015).
The census tract level data allowed for comparison in
the study years because the census tract boundaries
are normalized to those of the 2010 data.
(2) Similar to the datasets used in the study of Kyne
(2015), this study includes the 2010 Census TIGER/
Line Shapefiles and the 2010 U.S. Census Summary
File 1 Demographic Profile (DP1) for the United
States and Puerto Rico were used in order to join the
normalized data containing study variables (United
States Census Bureau 2010). The 2010 Census
TIGER/Line Shapefiles were purposefully used
because the most recent decadal dataset used in this
study was 2010. In addition, the data in 1990 and
2000 were normalized to those of the 2010
boundaries.
(3) The location of each of the 104 nuclear reactors
located at 65 sites that are currently in operation in
the United States was obtained from the NRC’s
website (U.S. NRC 2012b). As noted earlier, there are
four power plants that were permanently shut down
before the time this manuscript is published. It results
in a fleet of 99 reactors located in 61 sites across 30
states as of August 2015 (U.S. NRC 2015).
To study the extent and severity of exposure to radiation
and radioactive effluents, our research required access to
two datasets:
(1) Radioactive effluents data from 2001 to 2008 were
acquired via the Center for Advanced Energy Studies
(Harris 2013). The effluents data include both liquid
and gaseous data for both pressurized water reactors
(PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWR).
(2) The reactor oversight dataset includes seven variables
that detail three strategic areas—reactor safety, radi-
ation safety, and safeguards. The seven variables are:
initiating events, mitigating systems, barrier integrity,
emergency preparedness, public radiation safety,
occupational radiation safety, and physical protection.
These have been published in 1Q/2012 ROP Perfor-
mance Indicators Summary (U.S. NRC 2012a).
To examine the risks of natural disaster associated with
individual NPPs, data regarding earthquakes (FEMA 2013;
USGS 2013), hurricanes, tornadoes, and volcanoes (The
Daily Beast 2011) were also obtained. These data contain
earthquake information measured on a seven-point scale
based on the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
map; hurricane predictions based on historical data as
compiled by the USGS; the number of predicted tornado
days per century based on a dataset spanning 1921–1995
(as complete and predictive a measure of tornadoes as is
currently available); and NPPs sorted by proximity to an
active volcano.
3.4 Study Method
This study mainly utilized two research methods in
searching answers to the research question. First, the study
used center point-distance suggested in the study of Kyne
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(2015) to measure distance from the NPPs to the hosting
communities that were located within a 50-mile radius
from the nearest NPP. Measuring the distance included two
steps. Step one included determining the geographic center
point of each included census tract in ArcMap 10.1 and
next selecting those geographic center points that fell
within a 50-mile radius of the nearest NPP, identified using
the ‘‘near’’ tool in ArcMap 10.1. This method provided the
exact distance between the census tracts’ center points and
the relevant NPPs. Step two included collapsing the
demographic characteristics of population living in the
census tracts within a 50-mile radius. Second, the study
constructed a potential risk index (PRI), which is a com-
posite index that can be applied to all U.S.-based NPPs.
The composite index measures the potential risks associ-
ated with NPPs. According to the OECD (2008), ‘‘a com-
posite indicator is formed when individual indicators are
compiled into a single index on the basis of an underlying
model of the multi-dimensional concept that is being
measured’’ (OECD 2008, p. 13). To construct the index, a
five-step process was followed: (1) construct a theoretical
framework; (2) select data; (3) normalize the data; (4)
determine the weights to be assigned to the different cat-
egories and types of data; and (5) aggregate the data.
3.5 NPP Potential Risk Index (NPP PRI)
A conceptual framework was initially constructed that
includes the three cornerstone potential risks that confront
any NPP—plant operational risks, natural disaster risks,
and plant locational risk (Fig. 3). The potential risks at
any NPP can stem from the plant itself—from its day-to-
day operations, the normal aging of the plant, and/or the
continued, ongoing exposure of the plant, its equipment
and its surroundings to radioactive effluents and their
byproducts. Next, any NPP could experience an accident,
including a core-damage event, which could be triggered
by a natural disaster such as an earthquake, hurricane, or
tornado. The plant’s physical location, especially when
near to densely populated areas, influences the level of the
potential risk it poses. If a given plant is sited in proximity
to a densely populated area, then the plant would be
potentially exposed to human-caused hazards such as an
airplane crash or a terrorist attack. The potential risk level
of each NPP can be measured across these three
dimensions.
Radioactive effluents are measured by the radioactive
materials that comprise the waste stream, and the associ-
ated radiation doses those materials deliver or carry with
them. Data for two types of radioactive effluents—gaseous
and liquid effluents—were summed to arrive at a total
volume of radioactive effluents released by each NPP. The
amount released was normalized according to the amount
of electricity generated at each site. The effective dose
data, which were computed using the normalized total
radioactive effluents, were then estimated using a dose
estimate model established by the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR) and employed by Harris and Miller (2008).
The dose estimate model made an assumption that a model
NPP site has a population density of 1036/square mile and
52/square mile for within 31 miles of the site and within
772 miles of the site, respectively (Kyne 2015). This model
site provides an estimate of the collective effective dose
Fig. 3 A conceptual framework
used in constructing a PRI for
U.S.-based NPPs
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(CED) per unit release for different release categories. The
CED per unit of electrical energy (man Sv (GW a) - ^1)
then can be obtained by multiplying the normalized
releases by the UNSCEAR-calculated values for CED per
unit release. Both the radioactive effluents released and
their effective dose data for the period 2001–2008 were
included in these calculations, and were given equal weight
in constructing the NPP PRI presented here.
Another type of data is near-miss events. The NRC
typically reports on near-miss events at NPPs. These events
are termed ‘‘near miss’’ because they raise the risk of
damage to the reactor core and endanger the safety of
workers and the public, but do not result in core meltdown
or radioactive effluent release (Lochbaum 2011, 2012,
2013, 2014, 2015). Analysis of a near-miss event will,
depending on the potential risk level of the event, involve
one of the NRC’s three investigative teams: the augmented
inspection team; the incident inspection team; or the spe-
cial inspection team. In the past 3 years, there have been
reports of near-miss events issued by each of the first two
teams. Known near-miss events that occurred in 2010,
2011, and 2012 were accounted for in constructing the NPP
PRI when the data analyses were conducted in August
2013. According to the World Nuclear Association (2013),
most NPPs are designed for a use life of 30–40 years. As
this window is extended out beyond planned operational
life, NPPs will face three problems. First, there are prob-
lems at aging plants with components and parts that need to
be replaced, some of which are difficult to access. Second,
there are issues with obsolescence, as many NPPs currently
in operation still use analog instrument and control sys-
tems. Third, due to heat and neutron irradiation, a plant’s
materials degrade with age. In the United States, World
Nuclear Association (2013) anticipated that more than 100
reactors will be granted license extensions from 40 to
60 years. These extensions pose a safety risk and raise
questions about the reliability at older NPPs. The age of the
plant, or its duration of operation in years, can be computed
by subtracting the year of issue of its commercial operating
license from the current year. The longer a NPP has been in
operation, the more likely it is that it may pose an
increasing risk.
A natural disaster such as an earthquake, hurricane, or
tornado may trigger a nuclear accident that can result in
damage being done to the reactor core. The likelihood of an
earthquake striking a NPP was estimated with data taken
from the United States Geologic Survey’s (USGS) National
Seismic Hazard Map. This map expresses the severity of
horizontal shaking as a percentage of g—the acceleration
of a falling object due to gravity—and displays shaking
intensity with seven color-coded categories that denote
‘‘seismic design categories’’ (USGS 2014). The categories
correspond to the likelihood of an earthquake occurring
that would lead to shaking and displacement of various
intensities (FEMA 2013). The USGS map was overlaid on
a map showing the locations of all 65 NPPs in the United
States. The output display was then used to assign each
NPP a value for the likelihood that an earthquake will
occur, on a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (least likely)
to 6 (most likely). Other natural hazards were considered
less likely to generate high risk levels, but were included in
the index analysis for completeness and because of their
importance for particular NPP sites. Hurricane risk was
measured by taking into account the number of hurricanes
predicted to make landfall near the site of a NPP in the
century to come (The Daily Beast 2011). Tornado risk was
measured by considering the average number of significant
tornadoes documented between 1921 and 1995 (The Daily
Beast 2011). Volcano risk was measured by distance miles
from the nearest volcano (The Daily Beast 2011). Finally,
locational risk was measured by distance in miles from the
nearest city.
Selected study indicators were normalized in order to
render them comparable to one another. The min–max
method was used to create an identical range by trans-
forming indicators to a scale that would allow for direct
comparisons. The method called for subtracting the mini-
mum value from the original value and then dividing by the
range of the indicator values. In other words, each variable
was rescaled to a range from 0 to 100, using the following
formula: ci
0 = [(ci - cmin)/(cmax – cmin)] 9 100, where
ci
0 = normalized or rescaled value; ci = original value;
cmin = minimum value in the variable; and cmax = maxi-
mum value in the variable (OECD 2008; Tate et al. 2010).
Construction of a composite index requires the appli-
cation of appropriate weighting methods. Principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) and factor analysis (FA) methods
were applied to aid in selecting appropriate weights, which
were then used to compile the selected study indicators into
a single composite index. Factor analysis with varimax
rotation was then performed in order to minimize
subindicators that had a loading on the same factor, which
allowed us to study that subset of the principal components
that accounted for the largest amount of variance. Four
factors that were associated with eigenvalues larger than
one were selected; these factors were responsible for a
cumulative contribution to the overall variance of 63.19 %
(Table 1). Weights from the factor loading results then
were computed. To do so, the weights first were normal-
ized by the squared factor loading (OECD 2008; Tate et al.
2010). For example, radiation dose in factor 4, of 0.863
loading, was normalized to 0.608, according to the for-
mula 0.608 = (0.863^2)/1.2238. After normalizing the
factor loadings, the composite weights were obtained.
Following the method Nicoletti et al. (2000) prescribe, four
subindicators were grouped with the highest factor loadings
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into four composite indicators: (1) subindicator 1 includes
significant tornados (with a weight of 0.197), likelihood of
earthquake (weight = 0.348), and distance from volcano
(weight = 0.383); (2) subindicator 2 contains radioactive
effluents (weight = 0.398), years in operation (weight =
0.359), and near-miss events (weight = 0.040); (3) subindi-
cator 3 comprises anticipated hurricanes (weight = 0.508)
and plant location distance from city (weight = 0.267); and
(4) subindicator 4 is constituted by radiation dose
(weight = 0.863). Next each of the four immediate subindi-
cators was aggregated by applying the weight of the pro-
portion of the explained variance in the dataset: 0.2853
for subindicator 1 (0.2853 = 1.6222/(1.62 ? 1.47 ? 1.37 ?
1.22)); 0.2579 for subindicator 2; 0.2416 for subindicator 3;
and 0.2152 for subindicator 4. The NPP PRI was obtained via
the following equation: NPP PRI = (0.2853 9 subindicator
1 ? 0.2579 9 subindicator 2 ? 0.2416 9 subindicator 3 ?
0.2152 9 subindicator 4).
To understand the relative risk levels that exist among the
65 NPPs operating in the United States, the composite index
scores were ranked from highest to lowest. These were
grouped into four categories based on their percentile rank:
(1) low risk, between 0 and 25th percentile; (2) moderate
risk, between [25th and 50th percentile; (3) high risk,
between[50th and 75th percentile; and (4) very high risk,
between[75th and 100th percentile. There are 16 plants in
each of the categories low risk, moderate risk, and high risk,
and 17 in the category very high risk (Table 2; Fig. 4).
4 Findings and Discussion
This section discusses sociodemographic compositions by
NPP PRI level and changes in demographic compositions
during the study years. First, the study provides a discussion
on findings of demographic characteristics of the population
living within a 50-mile radius and their respective exposure
to different levels of NPP PRI in 2010. Second, the study
traces changes of demographic characteristics between the
two study periods, 1990–2000 and 2000–2010, and looks
into changes in demographic characteristics associated with
the four levels of NPP PRI in the two study periods.
4.1 The Sociodemographic Composition
of Populations According to NPP PRI Level
The 17 NPPs classified as very high risk accounted for the
largest geographic area, some 83,640 square miles, or 28 %
of the total land area occupied by NPPs in the United
States. The highest percent Black (22 %) among poten-
tially at-risk populations was found in the host communi-
ties of NPPs sorted into this subgroup. The second largest
area, 74,961 square miles or 25 % of the total area occu-
pied by NPPs in the United States, was associated with the
16 NPPs assigned to the high-risk category of the PRI as of
2010 (Table 3; Fig. 5). Because the census tract boundaries
for prior-year data were normalized to the 2010 census-
tract boundaries, these areas do not change when analyzing
U.S. Census data for the years 1990 and 2000.
The at-risk populations included a greater percent Asian,
percent Hispanic, percent Native American, percent Other,
and percent Color than compared to their counterpart
populations living in communities outside of the areas
prone to nuclear power-related risks for each of the four
PRI categories (Table 3). Populations living in close
proximity to a NPP classified as low risk registered the
highest percent unemployed and the highest percent living
in renter-occupied housing units. Similar patterns were
identified in the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census data (Fig. 4).
Table 1 Factor loadings of the NPP PRI using the varimax method
Variable Factor loadings Normalized factor loadings
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Radiation dose -0.010 0.096 -0.068 0.863 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.608
Radioactive effluents -0.121 0.764 0.087 0.306 0.009 0.398 0.006 0.077
Years in operations -0.282 -0.725 0.112 0.186 0.049 0.359 0.009 0.028
Near-miss events 0.068 0.242 0.189 -0.116 0.003 0.040 0.026 0.011
Significant tornados -0.565 0.348 0.477 -0.330 0.197 0.083 0.166 0.089
Likelihood of earthquake 0.751 0.186 0.097 0.020 0.348 0.024 0.007 0.000
Anticipated hurricanes -0.131 -0.055 -0.835 0.117 0.011 0.002 0.508 0.011
Plant location distance from city -0.026 -0.360 0.605 0.448 0.000 0.088 0.267 0.164
Distance from volcano 0.789 0.015 0.112 -0.121 0.383 0.000 0.009 0.012
Eigenvalues 1.6222 1.4668 1.3742 1.2238
Explained variance/total 0.2853 0.2579 0.2416 0.2152
Italicized values indicate strong association between the variables and the latent factors, Factor 1, 2, 3, and 4
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In addition to the highest percent Black (22.34 %)
occurring among the host communities of NPPs classified
as being at very high risk, these same NPPs were also
associated with the highest percent Color (42.60 %)
(Table 3). Similar patterns were observed in the data from
1990 to 2000 (Fig. 4).
In short, the minority groups who are in low socioeco-
nomic status inevitably shoulder the burden of potential risks
associated with the NPPs. The study provides two notions in
regard to demographic characteristics of populations and
their exposure to the four levels of risks. One notion is that
there are variations in exposure to the four levels of risks
among the populations living within a 50-mile radius. The
other notion is that the minority groups living within a
50-mile radius inevitably expose to the four different levels
of risks while their counterparts in the outlying areas do not
expose to the risks. According to Bullard (1996, p. 493), ‘‘all
people and communities are entitled to equal protection of
environmental and public health laws and regulation.’’ It is
obvious that the communities living within a 50-mile radius
from the nearest NPP faced environmental justice issues
(Fig. 5). The findings reflect the fact that authorities made
environmental decisions on siting of U.S. NPPs without
incroporating consideration of unequal impacts from envi-
ronmental hazards (Kyne 2015).
4.2 Demographic Trends by PRI Category
Changes over time in the demographics of the populations
associated with each of the four PRI categories across two
periods—1990–2000, and 2000–2010 were also examined.
Between 2000 and 2010, percent Asian showed the greatest
increase, up 48 % in areas classified as moderate risk; in
those same areas, meanwhile, percent people living below
the federal poverty line increased 1.97 % points. Percent
Hispanic and percent Black registered the most pronounced
increases, 44 and 17 %, respectively, in areas classified as
high risk. Overall, percent Color showed the greatest
increase in the high risk category, up 54 and 30 %,
respectively, in 1990–2000 and 2000–2010.
The findings show that minority racial and ethnicity
groups including Asian, Black, Color, Hispanic, and Native
American increased during the two study periods,
1990–2000 and 2000–2010 (Table 4; Fig. 6).
Fig. 4 Distribution of NPP-related potential risk in the United States
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Fig. 5 Demographic characteristics of populations living within a 50-mile radius of a NPP, as sorted by NPP PRI categories in 1990, 2000, and
2010
Table 3 Demographic characteristics of populations living within a 50-mile radius of a NPP, classified according to four PRI categories using
the 2010 U.S. Census data
2010 Low risk Moderate risk High risk Very high risk Total Outside
Tracts 8445 5659 4966 4325 23,395 49,662
Tract area (sq. mile) 71,490 70,709 74,961 83,640 300,801 3,495,942
Total population 31,989,280 24,130,408 22,277,072 17,674,888 96,071,648 207,893,616
White 21,626,292 18,518,612 15,479,203 12,423,962 68,048,072 156,847,632
Black 5,402,879 2,861,589 3,268,325 3,949,417 15,482,210 22,496,542
Asian 2,036,120 1,041,474 1,398,483 399,936 4,876,013 9,801,153
Native American 109,554 67,366 95,330 60,454 332,704 2,147,761
Other 2,814,435 1,641,369 2,035,730 841,119 7,332,653 16,600,536
Hispanic 4,772,429 2,803,678 3,462,599 2,949,929 13,988,635 33,738,896
Color 12,612,146 7,067,641 8,591,788 7,529,264 35,800,840 71,591,664
White (%) 67.60 76.74 69.48 70.29 70.83 75.45
Black (%) 16.89 11.86 14.67 22.34 16.12 10.82
Asian (%) 6.37 4.32 6.28 2.26 5.08 4.71
Native American (%) 0.34 0.28 0.43 0.34 0.35 1.03
Other (%) 8.80 6.80 9.14 4.76 7.63 7.99
Hispanic (%) 14.92 11.62 15.54 16.69 14.56 16.23
Color (%) 39.43 29.29 38.57 42.60 37.26 34.44
Renter-occupied housing units (%) 36.28 26.38 29.32 28.18 30.69 28.73
College degree or higher (%) 31.44 30.66 30.49 26.07 30.03 26.9
Unemployed (%) 8.37 7.97 7.79 8.13 8.09 7.84
Below poverty line (%) 13.97 11.56 11.47 14.09 12.81 14.28
Mean household income ($) 77,805 77,145 78,260 67,522 75,845 68,593
Data source GeoLytics (2012c)
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5 Conclusion
This analysis has provided one potential means of quanti-
fying the level of potential risk associated with a given
NPP and has investigated the disparities that exist in the
sociodemographic characteristics of the populations that
are exposed to different levels of risk. Much of the
potential risk associated with NPPs stems from the fact that
radiation is produced and may be released by these facili-
ties. Exposure to radiation, regardless of the amount,
increases the risk of disease, specifically cancer. A pattern
was identified showing that populations living in areas
associated with the greatest amount of potential risk tended
to include a higher percentage of minorities than did the
Fig. 6 Changes in demographic characteristics of populations living in host communities of NPPs falling into different PRI levels
Table 4 Changes in demographic characteristics of populations living within a 50-mile radius of a NPP, classified according to four PRI
categories using 2010 U.S. Census data
Percent change Low risk Moderate RISK High risk Very high risk Total Outside Year on year
Asian 59 % 71 % 62 % 45 % 61 % 40 % 1990–2000
Asian 35 % 48 % 46 % 44 % 41 % 38 % 2000–2010
Black 7 % 15 % 21 % 16 % 13 % 16 % 1990–2000
Black 2 % 10 % 17 % 6 % 7 % 13 % 2000–2010
Color 33 % 50 % 54 % 33 % 40 % 46 % 1990–2000
Color 12 % 28 % 30 % 17 % 20 % 25 % 2000–2010
Hispanic 42 % 92 % 80 % 52 % 59 % 62 % 1990–2000
Hispanic 22 % 49 % 44 % 37 % 35 % 36 % 2000–2010
Native American 28 % 20 % 33 % 31 % 28 % 20 % 1990–2000
Native American -6 % -11 % -6 % -4 % -7 % 3 % 2000–2010
Other 120 % 161 % 193 % 174 % 150 % 128 % 1990–2000
Other 3 % 25 % 19 % 9 % 12 % 3 % 2000–2010
Below poverty line (%) 0.13 0.01 0.35 -0.67 -0.03 -1.10 1990–2000
Below poverty line (%) 1.00 1.97 1.25 0.45 1.17 1.55 2000–2010
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average host community regardless of PRI category as of
1990, 2000, and 2010. This implies that among the at-risk
population, different groups of people face different levels
of risk associated with or attributable to NPPs. This indi-
cates that there are two layers of environmental justice
issues. One layer of environmental justice issues involves
those people living in host communities that are within a
50-mile radius of a NPP, who face environmental justice
issues deriving from the potential risks associated with the
NPP and is made evident when comparing these groups
with their counterparts that live outside of those areas
(Tables 2, 3). The second layer of environmental jus-
tice issues is that, among the populations of the host
communities, certain groups—or entire populations at
certain NPPs—are exposed to different levels of
potential risk, classified here as low risk, moderate
risk, high risk, and very high risk, depending on the
unique circumstances and location of the individual
NPP.
In addition, when the sociodemographic trends over
that same time frame were considered, the investigators
found that the largest percent changes had occurred in
the percent Hispanic and percent Black in the high-risk
category. As a percent, the host community population
living in moderate risk areas increased during the study
period 1990–2010. This implies that the environmental
justice issues are on-going and have been in existence for
at least three decades. The long-term presence of envi-
ronmental justice issues facing the NPP host communi-
ties, coupled with the large size of such communities—
estimated to be more than one third of the total U.S.
population.
The study provided findings that there are environ-
mental justice issues as a result of environmental deci-
sion making of siting NPPs without considering unequal
impacts of hazards from them. The environmental justice
issues have negative impacts on health and wellbeing of
people living near the power plants (Kyne 2015). In fact,
the environmental justice issues present enormous
challenges to all stakeholders seeking to address these
issues. In case of extreme events, the emergency evac-
uation will be very complex and will pose challenges to
people who live near the NPPs. We think that partici-
patory decision making among major stakeholders could
not be avoided to collectively solve the environmental
justice issues.
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